External Connections
Outbound links to SaaS and the web, reached only through a customer-owned egress broker. Each connection is a documented, risk-accepted object — distinct from a Tool — so every interconnection has an auditable record.
Every accepted connection is a row in the CA-3 / SA-9 interconnection inventory, attributed to a named risk owner and a review date.
Egress topology
An agent never reaches an external service directly. The path always runs Agent → Tool → egress broker → service. Solid = accepted; dashed = proposed.
ServiceNow GovCloud
acceptedCUIFedRAMP-High far end over PrivateLink, CUI permitted under existing ATO boundary. Per-end-user delegation only; no service-wide token.
Tenable.io
acceptedFOUORead-only scan results, FOUO. Service identity acceptable — no end-user data crosses the boundary.
USA.gov / data.gov Search
acceptedPUBLICweb searchdata.govsearch.govusa.govThe broker resolves only these domains. Every response is labelled untrusted — downstream egress/mutating tools require a Safe-Sink declaration.
| Query | Resolved domain | Label | When |
|---|---|---|---|
| SAM.gov entity registration status lookup | search.gov | untrusted | 6d ago |
| FAR clause text by reference number | data.gov | untrusted | 6d ago |
| GSA schedule contract status lookup | usa.gov | untrusted | 7d ago |
Bounded web search, public sources only, domain allowlist enforced at the broker. Every response labelled untrusted; downstream egress/mutating tools require Safe-Sink declaration.
NWS Weather API
proposedPUBLIC- Traffic to NWS Weather API will leave the platform boundary via the egress broker (egress-broker-7741).
- Authorization status on file: none.
- Accepting records you as the named risk owner in the CA-3 / SA-9 inventory.
Document + risk-accept. An external connection is not FedRAMP-required — but it is the auditable record of every external interconnection: what crosses the boundary, who owns it, who accepted the residual risk, and when it is next reviewed.